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Abstract: At the core of Nigeria's constitutional practice lies the doctrine of separation of powers. The 
application of the principle is such that power under Nigeria's presidential cum federal system is delineat-
ed both horizontally and vertically. Even though the doctrine has a major feature of every constitution in 
the world, its implementation does not seem satisfactory given the insults that have been carried out by 
successive governments. This paper examines the doctrine of separation of powers and its 
complicatedness as regards to its practice in Nigeria's constitutional democracy. Reflecting on the history 
of Nigeria, this paper will discuss the eroded implementation of the principle of separation. As a result, it 
seems to be that the concept of "separation" is not going well and tends to fuse the function of executive 
and legislative institutions. In this situation, the principle is in a dilemma. This paper further offers a 
flicker of hope by pointing to the fact that all hopes do not appear lost, as the Judiciary still maintains 
some level of ‘separateness,' except that only time will tell as to how much this lasts. 
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A critical feature of every modern 
Constitution is the separation of powers 
(hereinafter referred to as the doctrine) 
amongst the different organs or branches of 
government. The doctrine not only serves as 
a guide to the proper organization of powers 
and government, as well as being the most 
effective embodiment of the spirit underlying 
it,1 it is further founded on the existential fear 
that to concentrate powers in just one branch, 
person, or group of persons is tantamount to 
abuse of power, arbitrariness, and tyranny. 
From its humble origin, the doctrine has had 
a significant influence on the running of 
governmental affairs and has helped put in 
check the morbid desires of men of ill will. 
However, in lieu of rapid political 
development of the 21st century, its relevance 
as the touch-bearer of contemporary 
constitutional governance has come under 
severe attack.  
Right from independence, successive 
governments in Nigeria have engineered 
                                                          
1  M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation 
of Powers, (Indianapolis: Liberty Funds Inc., 2nd 
edn., 1998), pp1-443. 
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different constitutions all providing for the 
doctrine of separation of powers.2 The latest 
is the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 1999.3 Notwithstanding the exist-
ence of the doctrine in these documents, the 
practical reality is that power rather than 
being ‘separated’ has not only enjoyed an 
appearance of ‘fusion’, but most pathetically 
has been personalised by the Executive 
branch in such a manner as to make it seem 
as representing government in totality. This 
scenario has also been replicated at the other 
two levels of government, i.e., the State and 
Local governments. Against this background, 
a fast-maturing notion today by legal schol-
ars such as Calabresi is that the doctrine is in 
crisis.4 The position is that both Executive 
and Legislature are so entangled in each oth-
er functions. So, both institutions have 
blurred the lines of separation.5 The refer to 
examples such as the Executive encroaching 
on the function of law-making through the 
issuance of executive orders and proclama-
tions, as well as the Legislature getting in-
                                                          
2  From 1954 when a new era of Self-government 
emerged, the Nigerian State has engineered seven 
federal constitutions namely the 1954 Constitution, 
the 1960 Independence Constitution, the 1963 Re-
publication Constitution, the 1979 Constitution, 
the 1989 Constitution, the 1995 Constitution, and 
the 1999 Constitution. It is worth stating that both 
the 1989 and the 1995 Constitution were inchoate 
documents, and never became fully-fledged Con-
stitutions. For an extensive overview on the trajec-
tory of Nigerian Constitutions, see generally A. 
Gboyega, ‘The Making of the Nigerian Constitu-
tion,' in O. Oyediran (ed.), Nigerian Government 
& Politics under Military Rule, (Lagos: Friends 
Foundation Publishers Ltd., 1988), pp1-319. 
3  This Constitution is more notoriously referred to as 
Decree No.24 of 1999, as the last act of Military 
law-making by the administration of General Ab-
dulsalami Abubakar. 
4   S.G. Calabresi, M.E. Berghausen, and S. Albert-
son, “The Rise and Fall of the Separation of Pow-
ers,” (2012), 106 (2), Northwestern University Law 
Review, pp527–550. 
5   Note 4. 
volved in executive functions through con-
gressional oversight activities as pointers to 
the erosion of the doctrine.6 In order to 
thematically address these issues as well as 
deepen the ongoing conversation, this Paper 
will be examining the doctrine first from an 
historical context, to discussing its seeming 
decline under Nigeria’s Constitutional 
framework, towards determining how the 
country’s constitutional experience can be 
the better for it. 
 
DEFINITION AND HISTORY OF THE 
DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF 
POWERS 
The doctrine of separation of powers 
articulates that each branch of government is 
distinct, independent, and not seen as 
exercising the powers of others.7 It has also 
been described to mean that one branch 
should not control or interfere with the work 
of another.8 The separation of legislative, 
executive, and judiciary powers is a key 
principle in most democratic Constitutions.9 
Different arguments have been pushed 
concerning the allocation of governmental 
powers following this doctrine. The 
functionalists argue that most Constitutions 
do not say much about the distribution of 
                                                          
6   Note 4. 
7  A. Hamilton, J. Madison, and J. Jay, The 
Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in 
Favour of the New Constitution, as Agreed upon 
by the Federation Convention September 17, 1787, 
(The Lawbook Exchange Ltd., 2005), pp1-628. 
8  A.W. Bradley and K.D. Ewing, Constitutional and 
Administrative Law, (Longman, 13th edn., 2003), 
p84. 
9  K. Fuchs and F. Herold, “The Costs and Benefits 
of a Separation of Powers: An Incomplete 
Contracts Approach,” (2011), 13 (1), American 
Law and Economics Review, pp131-167. 
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powers amongst different branches of 
government.10  
The early origin of the doctrine dated 
back to the 4th century B.C. when Aristotle, 
in his treatise ‘Politics’, advocated for three 
agencies of government i.e. the general 
assembly, the public officials, and the 
judiciary, to be the structure of the State.11 
Aristotle tried to make distinctions between 
the function and authority of these three 
branches that make up a government.12  After 
the fall of the Roman Empire, and with 
Europe divided into several nation-states, 
most of the power of the state was domiciled 
in tyrannical monarchs, except for the 
English society where the Parliament had 
emerged. Following development under 
English constitutional rule, John Locke 
developed the idea of the three branches of 
government which he gave the titles 
Executive, Legislature, and Judiciary.13 
According to Locke to secure the gains of 
liberty, power must not be seen as 
concentrated in one man, but in separate 
hands or institutions.14 He was of the view 
that the greatest danger to democratic rule 
would be to situate all powers in the hands of 
the legislature as they may remove 
themselves from the purview of the law, with 
                                                          
10 P. L. Strauss, 1984, “The Place of Agencies in 
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth 
Branch,” Columbia Law Review, 84, pp573-597. 
11  Aristotle, Politics, (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Co., Translated by C.D.C Reeve 1998), 
pp1-384. 
12 Note 11. After Aristotle’s ground work, James 
Harrington an English scholar espoused the 
doctrine in his work, ‘Common Wealth of 
Oceana’, (1656), which romanticized a utopian 
political system built on the separation of powers. 
13  J. Locke, Treatise of Civil Government, 1690, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Peter 
Laslett ed.,1988), pp366-367 
14 Note 13. See also A. Appodarai, The Substance of 
Politics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
pp1-602. 
the evil that it makes the citizens subject to 
the arbitrariness and whimsical 
idiosyncrasies of men of evil intentions.15 
However, a stoic opponent of the doctrine is 
Thomas Hobbes who in his vitriolic 
denouncement of the doctrine argued that 
governmental powers were indivisible and 
inseparable.16 
In the long history of constitutional 
thoughts, the opinion of other leading 
constitutionalists has also helped to shape the 
development of the doctrine. The trio of 
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and 
Thomas Jefferson, stood out in their genera-
tion as men equipped with extraordinary 
foresight and vision, that saw them produce 
new understanding of political power and the 
institution of government among the 
people.17 According to them, “If Men were 
Angels, no government would be necessary, 
and if Angels were to govern men, neither 
external nor internal controls on government 
would be necessary”.18 They further stated 
that, “In framing a government which is to be 
administered by men over men, the great 
difficulty lies in this – You must first enable 
the government to control the governed, and 
in the next place oblige it to control itself”.19 
They then concluded that, “For one, a 
dependence on the people is the primary 
control on the government, but experience 
has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary 
precautions”.20  
                                                          
15  Note 14. 
16 T. Hobbes, Leviathan 1651 – (Cambridge Text in 
the History of Political Thought, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, Richard Tuck Ed., 
1996), pp1–510. 
17  C.D. Bowen, Miracle at Philadelphia: The Story of 
the Constitutional Convention May – September 
1787, (Back Bay Books, 1986), pp1–333. 
18  J. Madison, Federalist Papers No. 51, (1788).  
19  Note 18. 
20  Note 18. 
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There were, however, aspects of diver-
gence in their views. James Madison, for 
instance, was of the opinion that self-interest 
was an inevitable force in check-mating the 
political behavior of leaders.21 Extending this 
argument, he said, “as there is a degree of 
depravity in mankind which requires a 
certain degree of circumspection and 
distrust, so there are other qualities in 
human nature, which justify a certain portion 
of esteem and confidence”.22 He then goes 
ahead to add that the “aim of every political 
constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain 
for ruler men who possess the most wisdom 
to discern, the most virtue to pursue, and the 
common good of society; and in the next 
place, to take the most effectual precautions 
for keeping them virtuous while they continue 
to hold public trust”.23 Thus, though Madison 
agreed with Locke that where power is 
domiciled in just one branch of government, 
tyrannical rule is the result;24 he was also of 
the opinion that such men may possess 
certain inherent qualities that may be enough 
to keep them in check. 
However, his fellow Federalists 
compatriots disagreed with him, saying self-
interest all by itself is not enough. According 
to Hamilton, “The supposition of universal 
venality in human nature, is little less an 
                                                          
21  Note 18. 
22  Note 18. 
23  J. Madison, Federalist Papers, No. 57, (1788).  
24  In making this point, he opined as follows, “The 
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, 
and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a 
few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-
appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced 
the very definition of tyranny. Were the federal 
Constitution, therefore, really chargeable with this 
accumulation of power, or with a mixture of 
powers, having a dangerous tendency to such an 
accumulation, no further arguments would be 
necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the 
system”. See J. Madison, The Federalist, No. 47, 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), pp1-560. 
error in political reasoning than the 
supposition of universal rectitude”.25 Thomas 
Jefferson, however, appears to depart from 
the position of his fellow intellectuals 
radically. Expressing rather iconoclastic 
thoughts, he was of the opinion that, 
"turbulence is productive of good, it prevents 
the degeneracy of government, and nourishes 
a general attention to the public affairs. I 
hold that a little rebellion now and then is a 
good thing”.26 The sum of the thoughts of 
these outstanding intellectuals, is that the 
only security against a gradual concentration 
of powers in one hand lies in granting unto 
the three branches of government the 
constitutional means to resist the 
encroachment of others.27 In this wise, 
constitutional safeguard are designed in a 
manner that the defense provided for, is 
commensurate to the danger of attack, such 
that reckless ambition in one branch is 
countered effectively by potent checks in the 
other.28 
Following the works of the French 
Political theorist and philosopher, Baron de 
Montesquieu, separation of powers gained 
momentum as a major pillar of Dicey’s Rule 
of Law,29 particularly one that will serve as a 
bulwark against the centralization of power 
in the hands of a single individual, group, or 
institution.30 According to Montesquieu who 
                                                          
25  A. Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, No.76 
26  See Letter to Madison, Jan. 30, 1787, in The 
Portable Thomas Jefferson 416-410 (M. Peterson 
ed. 1975) 
27  J. Madison, n. 15. 
28  Note 27. 
29  A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law 
of the Constitution, (Macmillan Publishers, 10th 
Edn., 1959), p424. 
30  Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, (Frank 
Neuman ed., Encyclopaedia Britannica edn., 1952) 
(1748). Edition published in Paris in 1877, 11.6. 
The title of the chapter is ‘De la constitution d’ 
Angleterre’; See also Charles de Montesquieu, The 
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distastefully resented the idea of absolutism, 
where powers are fused the consequences are 
condemned to be dire.31 Montesquieu’s 
postulations is rooted in the twin idea of rule 
of law and liberty as resistance against the 
tyrannically governments that were the order 
of the day in then Continental Europe.32 
However, for Montesquieu executive power 
was a power to execute all laws except the 
exercise of judicial powers.33 This was a 
position radically different from Locke’s 
argument that executive power and judicial 
powers were historically combined as one. 
The same sentiment was shared by the 
                                                                                        
Spirit of Laws – Cambridge Text in the History of 
Political Thought, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, A. M. Cohler et al. eds., 1989), 
pp1-747. 
31  Note 32. Montesquieu expressed this thinking in 
the following words, “When the legislative and 
executive powers are united in the same person, or 
in the same body of magistrates, there can be no 
liberty, because apprehensions may arise, lest the 
same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical 
laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner. 
Again, there is no liberty if the judicial power be 
not separated from the legislative and executive. 
Where it joined with the legislative, the life and 
liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary 
control: for the judge would then be the legislator. 
Where it joined with the executive power, the judge 
might behave with violence and oppression. 
Miserable indeed would be the case, were the 
same man or the same body, whether of the nobles 
or of the people, to exercise those three powers, 
that of enacting laws, that of executing the public 
resolutions and that of judging the crimes or 
differences of individuals”. However, his notion of 
separation of powers has been heavily criticised. 
See L. Claus, ‘Montesquieu's Mistakes and the 
True Meaning of Separation of Powers’, (2005), 
25, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, p419. 
32  From the rule of Alexander, the great down to 
Napoleon Bonaparte, the rise of tyranny was a part 
of the political order in early medieval Europe. 
33  Montesquieu cited structural reasons for why the 
judicial should be separated from the executive. 
For example, he pointed out that in monarchic 
states, the prince was the prosecutor who punished. 
If the same prince also judged the case, the prince 
"would be both judge and party,” and that clearly 
would be improper.  
English thinker, Blackstone who postulated 
that executive power was the power to 
execute laws.34 He added that, “executive 
powers of the laws is lodged in a single 
person (in England); they have all the 
advantages of strength and dispatch”.35  This 
position had been hinged on the fact that the 
concept of liberty had by that time come to 
enjoy a pride of place under English 
Constitutional framework, a development 
that was helped greatly by the inspiration that 
came from two leading human rights36 
documents of that time, the English Bill of 
Rights 1686, and the Magna Carta 1215.37 
The influence of these two landmark 
documents pushed for a system in which the 
powers of the English Monarch which was 
hitherto absolute and unchallengeable, would 
be limited and a part exercised by the English 
                                                          
34 In echoing Montesquieu thoughts, Sir William 
Blackstone noted as follow, “In all tyrannical 
government the supreme magistery, or the right 
both of making and enforcing the laws, is vested in 
one and the same man, or one and the same body 
of men; and whenever these two powers are united 
together, there can be no public liberty. The 
magistrate may enact tyrannical laws, and execute 
them in a tyrannical manner, since he is possessed 
in quality of dispenser of justice, with all the 
quality of dispenser of justice, with all the power 
which he as legislator thinks proper to give 
himself. But, where the legislature and executive 
authority are in distinct hands, the former will take 
care not to entrust the later with so large a power, 
as may tend to the subversion of its own 
independence, and therewith of the liberty of the 
subject”. See William Blackstone, Commentaries 
on the Laws of England, (Clarendon Press, 1st ed, 
1765), pp 259-260. 
35  Note 34. 
36  Nurhidayatuloh, N., & Febrian, F., 2019, “ASEAN 
and European Human Rights Mechanisms, What 
Should be Improved?,” Padjadjaran Journal of 
Law, 6(1), pp151-167. 
37  English Constitutional history credits both the Bill 
of Rights and the Magna Carta with shaping the 
development of constitutional rights in the British 
Empire and the gradual dismantling of the quiet 
authoritarianism of age-long Monarch that had 
ruled with a fiat. 
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Parliament.38 Thus, with the birth of the 
Crown and Parliament as two organs of the 
then English Constitutional structure, 
Montesquieu through his postulations 
advocated inclusion of the Judiciary, to be 
the third leg of the tripod.   
In most modern governments, power in 
this regard is of three species vested in dis-
tinct branches of government i.e. the Legisla-
ture which makes the law, the Executive 
which executes the law, and the Judiciary 
which interprets the law.39 Where this de-
partmentalization is properly in place, the 
argument is that government will run 
smoothly.40 From its early practice, the doc-
trine of separation of powers is now a land-
mark feature of the US Constitution,41 and 
has emerged as an important part of the gen-
eral understanding of the doctrine of consti-
tutionalism.42 Not only does it advocate that 
                                                          
38  As a matter of fact, this era saw the quick rise of 
the corollary doctrine of ‘Parliamentary 
Supremacy’, in which for the first time, the powers 
of the Crown was questioned and the authority of 
the Parliament to make any law, amend any law, or 
even repeal any law, was seen as final. 
39  For an extensive read, see generally O. Abifarin, 
Essays on Constitutional and Administrative Law 
under the 1999 Constitution, (Kaduna: 
Mofolayomi Press, 2000), p5; K.M. Mowe, 
Constitutional Law in Nigeria, (Lagos: Malthouse 
Press Ltd, 2008), p23. 
40 N. Barber, 2001, “Prelude to the Separation of 
Powers,” Cambridge Law Journal, 60, p59. 
41 G. Casper, “An Essay in Separation of Powers: 
Some Early Versions and Practices,” (1989), 30, 
William and Mary Law Review, p211; L. Lessig 
and C.R. Sunstein, “The President and the 
Administration,” (1994), 93, Columbia Law 
Review, p1. 
42  J. Waldron, ‘Constitutionalism: A Skeptical View’, 
in T. Christiano and J. Christman (eds.), 
Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy, 
(2009), pp270-273; E. Carolan, The New 
Separation of Powers: A Theory of the Modern 
State, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
p18. 
each branch of government is independent,43 
it masterly annuls the possibility of such 
powers being concentrated in just one per-
son,44 as a way of protecting liberty,45 and 
guarantee the security of the state.46 For ex-
ample, in modern constitutional democracies, 
the independence of the judiciary is a sign-
post of the maturity of democratic rule.47  
 
THE NIGERIAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
MODEL OF THE DOCTRINE OF SEP-
ARATION OF POWERS 
The Doctrine of separation of powers is part 
of the heart and soul of Nigeria’s 1999 
Constitution. This Constitution, which is the 
country’s fundamental law makes an effort to 
intelligently allocate powers and functions 
amongst the three branches of government 
and their various subsidiaries.48 The twin 
objectives of the incorporation of the 
doctrine into the country’s constitutional 
framework is to ensure efficiency in 
governance delivery and prevent the exercise 
of arbitrary power.49  
Under the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, 
separation of powers is both horizontal and 
vertical. As regards to the horizontal 
                                                          
43  J. Alder, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 
(London: Macmillan Publishers, 7th Edn., 2009), 
p143. 
44 A. A. Taiwo, Separation of Powers: A Key 
Principle of Democratic Governance, (Ibadan: 
Ababa Press Ltd., 2013), p32. 
45 T. R. S. Allan, Law, Liberty and Justice: The Legal 
Foundations of British Constitutionalism, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), p3. 
46 D.J. Levinson and R.H. Pildes, 2006, “Separation 
of Parties, Not Powers,” Harvard Law Review, 
119, p2311. 
47  J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, (Dar es Salaam: 
Oxford University Press, 1967), p131. 
48  A. Phillips, “Nigeria’s Federal Financial Experi-
ence,” (1971), 9 (3), The Journal of Modern Afri-
can Studies, pp389-408. 
49  Keyamo v. House of Assembly of Lagos, (2000) 12 
NWLR, p218. 
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separation of powers, the framers of this 
organic law carefully departmentalised 
governmental powers into three branches, 
namely - the Legislature under Section 4 of 
the Constitution,50 the Executive under 
Section 5 of the same document,51 and the 
Judiciary under Section 6,52 in a manner that 
                                                          
50  In this wise, the Constitution provides that, “The 
legislative powers of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria shall be vested in a National Assembly for 
the Federation, which shall consist of a Senate and 
a House of Representatives. The National 
Assembly shall have power to make laws for the 
peace, order and good government of the 
Federation or any part thereof with respect to any 
matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List 
set out in Part I of the Second Schedule to this 
Constitution.   The power of the National Assembly 
to make laws for the peace, order and good 
government of the Federation with respect to any 
matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List 
shall, save as otherwise provided in this 
Constitution, be to the exclusion of the Houses of 
Assembly of States. In addition and without 
prejudice to the powers conferred by subsection 
(2) of this section, the National Assembly shall 
have power to make laws with respect to the 
following matters, that is to say - (a) any matter in 
the Concurrent Legislative List set out in the first 
column of Part II of the Second Schedule to this 
Constitution to the extent prescribed in the second 
column opposite thereto; and (b) any other matter 
with respect to which it is empowered to make 
laws in accordance with the provisions of this 
Constitution.” See Section 4 (1) (2) (3) & (4), 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1999. 
51 On this, the Constitution provides that, “Subject to 
the provisions of this Constitution, the executive 
powers of the Federation - (a) shall be vested in 
the President and may subject as aforesaid and to 
the provisions of any law made by the National 
Assembly, be exercised by him either directly or 
through the Vice-President and Ministers of the 
Government of the Federation or officers in the 
public service of the Federation; and (b) shall 
extend to the execution and maintenance of this 
Constitution, all laws made by the National 
Assembly and to all matters with respect to which 
the National Assembly has, for the time being, 
power to make laws”. 
52  For the powers in this regard, see Section 6 (1) & 
(2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 1999 which provides that, “The judicial 
the separateness envisaged is clear and 
distinct. This is established under Part II of 
the Constitution, under the broad heading of 
‘Powers of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria’.53 These provisions i.e. Sections 4, 
5, and 6 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, 
are so carefully worded to protect these 
powers. For instance, the powers of the 
Legislature to makes laws for the order and 
good governance of Nigeria has been 
reaffirmed in the leading Supreme Court’s 
decision in Attorney General of Bendel State 
v. Attorney General of the Federation.54 It is 
along these clear demarcations that each of 
these branches have carried out its core 
mandate in the development of Nigeria’s 
constitutional democracy, and to reaffirmed 
the constitutionality of the doctrine, the 
courts have not shied away from making far-
reaching pronouncements on its role. It was 
to this end that again in Attorney General of 
Bendel State v. Attorney General of the 
Federation,55 the Supreme Court this time 
per Eso J.S.C., speaking of separation of 
powers said: 
                                                                                        
powers of the Federation shall be vested in the 
courts to which this section relates, being courts 
established for the Federation. The judicial powers 
of a State shall be vested in the courts to which this 
section relates, being courts established, subject as 
provided by this Constitution, for a State”. See 
additionally Section 6 (3), (4), (5), & (6) of the 
same Constitution. Note that the notion of 
constitutionalising judicial powers is rooted in the 
need to resolve complex disputes resulting from 
the application of the laws. See H.L.A. Hart, The 
Concept of Law – (Clarendon Law Series), 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed., 2012), 
pp1-327. 
53  See also Chapter V which deals extensively with 
the Legislature, Chapter VI, which spells out sev-
eral other powers of the Executive, and Chapter 
VII which contains more information on Judicial 
powers of the State. 
54  (1981) 10 SC 1 at 198. 
55  (1982) 2 NCLR 509. 
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Now it is time that the legislature, especially 
in a country like ours which has accepted the 
doctrine of separation of powers and which 
has got that doctrine embodied in 
constitution, is a master of its own household.   
Additionally, the court opined in Unongo v. 
Aper Aku,56 that: 
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 1979 which is hereinafter referred to 
as the Constitution is very unique compared 
with the previous Constitution in that the 
executive, the legislature and the judiciary 
are each established as a separate organ of 
Government. There is what can be termed a 
cold calculated rigidity in this separation as 
shown in sections 4, 5 & 6 of the Constitution 
which established the legislative and the 
executive and the judicature respectively. 
 
There is also a vertical separation of 
powers, in which powers are devolved 
amongst the three tiers of government, 
namely the Federal, State, and Local 
Governments.57 The notion of both 
horizontal and vertical separation of powers 
is well captured in the opinion of the 
Supreme Court per Rhodes - Vivour J.S.C., 
in Ugba v Suswan,58 where the Court said: 
“The Constitution sets up a federal system by 
dividing powers between the federal and state 
governments. It establishes a national 
government divided into three independent 
branches. The executive branch makes the 
law, while the judiciary explains the law. 
There is no document superior to the 
Constitution in democratic governance. It is 
the heart and soul of the people.”59 
 
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE 
AGE OF ‘COOPERATION’: EXAMIN-
ING NIGERIA’S CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRACTICE 
                                                          
56   (1983) 2 SC NLR 332 at 361. 
57 This idea of devolution of powers can be gleaned 
from the provisions of Sections 2 & 3, Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. 
58  (2005) 1 WRN 1 at 64. 
59  Note 57. 
Notwithstanding the departmentalisation of 
the powers of the three branches under the 
1999 Nigerian Constitution, the operation of 
the document as a whole has rather shown a 
situation in which all three branches have 
their powers and responsibilities overlapping, 
in a manner that one cannot conclusively 
perform its constitutional function without 
the approval of one or the other two. This is 
in rooted in the idea of checks and balances, 
in which each of the branches serve as a 
check on the other. Scholars have opined that 
this framework as it can be found under 
American constitutional practice originally 
has its roots in British idea of a ‘mixed 
regime’, in which the Crown, the Lords, and 
the Commons were co-opted together so as to 
serve as a check on each other.60 However, 
this later gave way to the current system in 
which functions were separated.61   
Notwithstanding the truism in this 
statement, present reality appear to suggest 
that the way and manner modern 
governments are designed is such that the 
historical delineation of powers have become 
significantly blurred. In fact, it has been 
argued that in reality, the usefulness of 
separation of powers is consequent upon how 
willing each branch of government is ready 
to serve as a check on the other.62 Under 
modern governments, powers are therefore 
distributed in a manner that all branches of 
government can complement each other’s 
efforts towards delivering the goods of 
governance to the people.63 This is the 
invention of the idea of ‘cooperation’ in 
                                                          
60  S.G. Calabresi, M. E. Berghausen, and S. 
Albertson, n.4. 
61  Note 59. 
62  A. Appodarai, n.11. 
63  D. Kyritsis, 2012, “Constitutional Review in a 
Representative Democracy,” 32, Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies, p303. 
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constitutional democracies, an idea captured 
by Jackson, J. in Youngstown Co. v. 
Sawyer,64 where the United States (US) 
Supreme Court noted that, “While the 
Constitution diffuses power the better to 
secure liberty, it also contemplates that 
practice will integrate the dispersed power 
into a workable government65 
Across the length and breadth of the 
global constitutional landscape, this idea of 
cooperation has continued to gain ascendan-
cy, even as watertight separation of powers 
remains in decline. Two branches most cov-
ered in this regard are the Executive and 
Legislature, both of whom are the most 
visible branches of government, and both of 
whom are consistently called upon to 
‘cooperate,' ‘join hands,' and ‘complement' 
each-other to ensure the smooth running of 
government and avoid unnecessary 
shutdowns.  
However, in Nigeria it would appear as 
if this idea of cooperation has been taken to 
the extreme. Nigeria’s constitutional practice 
though catering for separation of powers in 
text, has conveniently operated a system in 
which the Legislature literarily bonds with 
the Executive, with this unholy alliance seen 
as a convention that every new government 
must follow. To make a clear distinction 
between this unconstitutional relationship 
and the developing idea of cooperation in 
other climes, it is important to examine how 
the framework of cooperation is crafted 
under the Nigerian constitution. In presenting 
this analysis, three (3) important areas in 
which this has been constitutionalised would 
be examined.  
The first is the framework dealing with 
spending/budgetary powers under the 
Constitution. In this respect Section 81 
                                                          
64  (1952) 343 US 579. 
65 Note 63. 
provides that, “The President shall cause to 
be prepared and laid before each House of 
the National Assembly at any time in each 
financial year estimates of the revenues and 
expenditure of the Federation for the next 
following financial year”.66 This is one side 
of the framework dealing with ‘power of the 
purse.' The other side is found in the 
combined provisions of Sections 59, 80, and 
162 which grants powers to the Legislature to 
do the following - approve the budget 
proposal from the Executive arm,67 forbids 
any spending unless the approval of the 
Legislature has been obtained,68 extends the 
same to every other spending that would be 
made by the Executive,69 and generally put 
overall fiscal responsibility in a siamese 
twins relationship involving the Executive 
and Legislature.70 In furtherance of this 
constitutional power, it has been argued that 
by reason of the Fiscal Responsibility Act, 
                                                          
66  Section 81 (1), Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, 1999. See additional 
provisions in Section 81 (2) (3) & (4). See the 
provision in Section 82 where the Constitution 
makes provision for emergencies and empowers 
the President to make spending in that regard with 
Legislature approval, with further backing granted 
such ‘urgent’ and ‘unforeseen’ situations in 
Section 83 (1) & (2).  These provisions can also be 
read alongside with the provisions of Section 61 
(1) of the Constitution.  
67  Section 59 (1) (2) (3) (4) & (5), Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. 
68  Section 80 (1) & (2), Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, 1999. 
69  Section 80 (3), Constitution of the Federal Repub-
lic of Nigeria, 1999. 
70  See Section 162 (2), Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 1999 which provides that, 
“The President, upon the receipt of advice from the 
Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Com-
mission, shall table before the National Assembly 
proposals for revenue allocation from the Federa-
tion Account, and in determining the formula, the 
National Assembly shall take into account, the al-
location principles especially those of population, 
equality of States, internal revenue generation, 
land mass, terrain as well as population density”. 
Olusola Babatunde Adegbite, Oreoluwa Omotayo Oduniyi, and Jubril Akinwunmi Farinde 
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the National Assembly is empowered, not 
only to approve the budgetary estimate 
presented by the Executive, but to alter same 
as it may deem necessary under the 
circumstances.71  
In recent times, however, the exercise of 
this power has come under severe criticism 
following series of allegations leveled against 
the 8th National Assembly on the issue of 
‘budget padding’ in the 2016 Appropriation 
Act.72 Specifically, the then Chairman House 
Committee on Appropriation, Hon. Ab-
dulmumin Jibrin accused the Speaker and 
other principal officers of the House of Rep-
resentatives of padding the 2016 budget to 
the tune of billions of naira targeted at cater-
ing for hitherto unbudgeted constituency pro-
jects.73 He also stated that he resisted at-
tempts on their part to insert about 
N40billion extra into the budget for personal 
benefits.74  He maintained that this padding 
took place outside the House’s main plenary 
sessions.75 A counter argument from the 
House leadership, however, pointed to the 
fact that the alterations were done to ensure 
the proper distribution of national resources 
to ensure that constituency projects got to 
every part of the country. 
Budget padding has been defined as, “to 
dishonestly add items to bills to obtain more 
money”.76 Even though the Constitution 
                                                          
71 A.O. Ekpu and P.I. Iweoha, 2017, “Powers of the 
Executive and Legislature in Budget Making 
Process in Nigeria: An Overview,” 57, Journal of 
Law, Policy, and Globalization, pp44-54. 
72  J. Odigbo, 2017, “Legislature and Budget Prepara-
tion in Nigeria: Understanding the Dilemma of 
Budget Padding in Nigeria,” 1 (1), South East Po-
litical Science Review, pp204- 216. 
73   Note 71. 
74   Note 71. 
75   Note 71. 
76   O. Ndukwe, 2017, “Public Budgetary Process and 
Budget Padding: The Nigerian Experience,” 5 (2), 
clearly provides for the budget-making pro-
cess to be a joint function between the Exec-
utive and the Legislature, the contention of 
the Executive remains that the only role ex-
pected of the Legislature is to approve the 
budgetary estimate and nothing more.77 It has 
however been argued that this position is not 
tenable, as the constitutional practice across 
the world particularly in other African na-
tions such as Ghana, Namibia, and Malawi 
show that the Legislature is indeed empow-
ered to alter the budget.78 It would appear 
therefore that there is nothing unconstitution-
al about the way and manner the National 
Assembly has exercised its powers in this 
regard, and that in fact, when the Legislature 
exercises such budgetary powers, it is a clear 
demonstration of the doctrine of separation 
of powers as against just being a mere rubber 
stamp. 
The Legislature also performs oversight 
functions whereby it supervises ministries, 
departments, and agencies of the Executive 
branch towards ensuring that approved 
budgetary estimates are adequately adhered 
to, as well as the execution of its legisla-
tions.79 The challenge is that often times this 
power of oversight has been criticised as 
been overtly abused by National Assembly 
members.80 It is however important to state 
that this framework is what has oiled the 
wheel of governance in Nigeria since the 
                                                                                        
GOUni Journal of Management and Social Sci-
ences, pp106-115. 
77   A.O. Ekpu and P.I. Iweoha, n. 70. 
78   Note 76. 
79 A.T. Shehu, “The Oversight Powers of the 
Legislature in Nigeria,” in Law, Politics and 
Development, The Challenges of an Emerging 
Mega-City: Essays in Honour of Babatunde Raji 
Fashola, SAN, (Nigerian Bar Association, Ikeja 
Branch 2012), p64. 
80  J.Y. Fashagba, 2009, “Legislative Oversight under 
the Nigerian Presidential System,” The Journal of 
Legislative Studies, 15 (4), pp439-459. 
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advent of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution.81 
The consequence, therefore, is that whenever 
the appropriation process is mismanaged 
courtesy of unabating disagreements between 
the Legislature and Executive, the result is 
always monumental.  
The second is the framework dealing 
with appointment powers under the same 
Constitution. In this wise, the Constitution 
provides for a plethora of appointments with 
the majority of them required to go through a 
rigorous process involving the approval or 
confirmation of the Upper Chamber of the 
Nigerian National Assembly, which is the 
Senate.82 Top on the list is the appointment 
of Ministers to assist the President in 
executing the functions of his office.83 For 
this class of appointments, Section 147 (2) of 
the Constitution provides that, “Any 
appointment to the office of Minister of the 
Government of the Federation shall, if the 
nomination of any person to such office is 
confirmed by the Senate, be made by the 
President”.84 Similarly, the Constitution 
further provides for a long-list of strategic 
offices of the State where appointments 
cannot be complete without the signature of 
the Senate. These  offices provided for in 
Section 153 includes the Code of Conduct 
                                                          
81  J. Wehner, 2002, “Parliament and the Power of the 
Purse: The Nigerian Constitution of 1999 in Com-
parative Perspective,” 46 (2), Journal of African 
Law, pp216-231. 
82  Under Nigeria’s constitutional framework, there is 
provision for a bicameral legislature made up of a 
Senate of 109 members and a House of Represent-
atives of 360 members. While the Senate is com-
monly referred to as the ‘Upper or Red Chamber,' 
the House of Representatives is called the ‘Lower 
or Green Chamber.' 
83  Kuswanto, K., 2018, “Consistency of the 
Presidential System in Indonesia,” Sriwijaya Law 
Review, 2(2), pp170-182. 
84 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1999. 
Bureau, the Council of State, the Federal 
Character Commission, the Federal Civil 
Service Commission, the Federal Judicial 
Service Commission, the Independent 
National Electoral Commission, the National 
Defence Council, the National Economic 
Council, the National Judicial Council, the 
National Population Commission, the 
National Security Council, the Nigeria Police 
Council, the Police Service Commission, and 
the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and 
Fiscal Commission.85  
While Section 231 of the Constitution 
provides that in appointing any person to 
Office as Chief Justice of Nigeria, as well as 
Justices of the Supreme Court such 
appointments must be approved by the 
Senate,86 Section 238 prescribes a similar 
procedure for appointment to Office of 
President of the Court of Appeal.87 The 
Constitution under Section 250 mandates the 
same for appointment to the Office of Chief 
Judge of the Federal High Court;88 Section 
256 for appointment to the Office of Chief 
Judge of the Hight Court of the Federal 
Capital Territory (FCT);89 Section 261 for 
appointment to the Office of the Grand Kadi 
of the Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal 
Capital Territory (FCT);90 and Section 266 
for appointment to the Office of the President 
                                                          
85  Section 153 (1), (a – n), & Section 154 (1) (2) & 
(3), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nige-
ria, 1999. 
86  Section 231 (1) & (2), Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, 1999. 
87  Section 238 (1), Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, 1999. 
88  Section 250 (1), Constitution of the Federal Re-
public of Nigeria, 1999. 
89  Section 256 (1), Constitution of the Federal Re-
public of Nigeria, 1999. 
90  Section 261 (1), Constitution of the Federal Re-
public of Nigeria, 1999. 
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of the Customary Court of Appeal of the 
Federal Capital Territory.91  
The third is that which deals with the use 
of military and emergency powers under the 
Constitution. Depicting how power is 
arranged here, the Constitution under Section 
5 provides that the President is forbidden 
from declaring a state of war on another 
country, without approval based on a 
resolution of both Houses of the National 
Assembly in a joint session.92 Furthermore, 
he cannot deploy the Armed Forces of the 
Federation on combat duties in or outside the 
country, except by the approval of the 
National Assembly.93 The Constitution 
additionally provides for cooperation as 
regards the general operational use of the 
Armed Forces under Section 217 where it 
states that the Armed Forces shall be for the 
purpose of, “suppressing insurrection and 
acting in aid of civil authorities to restore 
order when called upon to do so by the 
President, but subject to such conditions as 
may be prescribed by an Act of the National 
Assembly”.94 The implication is that where it 
comes to the use of the military to maintain 
internal security, the power to deploy must 
be jointly exercised by both branches of 
government. Also, pursuant to Section 305 of 
the Constitution, the President cannot declare 
                                                          
91  Section 266 (1), Constitution of the Federal Re-
public of Nigeria, 1999. 
92  Section 5 (4) (a), Constitution of the Federal Re-
public of Nigeria, 1999. 
93  Section 5 (4) (b), Constitution of the Federal Re-
public of Nigeria, 1999. 
94  Section 217 (2) (c), Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, 1999. See also Section 218 
(4), which states that, “The National Assembly 
shall have power to make laws for the regulation 
of - (a) the powers exercisable by the President as 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the 
Federation; and (b) the appointment, promotion 
and disciplinary control of members of the armed 
forces of the Federation.” 
a state of emergency in any part of the 
country unless such proclamation is ratified 
by the National Assembly.95 
These three (3) are the notable areas in 
which the Constitution advocates 
Executive/Legislative cooperation. However, 
for a political class that view respect for the 
constitution with contempt, these ideals of 
cooperation have been promoted as grounds 
for Executive/Legislative illicit romance. The 
reality is that fusion operates in nearly every 
sphere of governance. Even in areas where 
the Constitution has not demanded 
cooperation, both branches of government 
literarily wine and dine together, pursuing the 
promotion and security of each other’s 
interests. It is instructive to point out that this 
practice is rooted in the mode through which 
political power is acquired. Under Nigeria’s 
democracy, as it is the case everywhere, 
power is attained through the conduct of 
periodic elections, where political parties as 
constitutionally recognised platforms are the 
only organisations allowed to sponsor 
candidates for elections. This means the idea 
of independent candidacy is forbidden.  With 
their status as major stakeholders in the 
political process, Nigerian political parties 
overtime evolved as dominant forces in the 
unending struggle for power. They see 
themselves as extremely powerful that their 
words must be final. Given their eminent 
position, their goal is often times less about 
the Constitution, but more about how to 
ensure that the power that has been acquired 
is retained at all cost.  
The experience in Nigeria is such that 
the moment a political party is declared 
victorious at the polls and assumes power, it 
literarily produces the leadership of both the 
                                                          
95  Section 305 (1) (2) & (3), Constitution of the Fed-
eral Republic of Nigeria, 1999. 
Separation of Powers Under the 1999 Nigerian Constitution: The Core Legal Dilemmas 
[247]     Sriwijaya Law Review  Vol. 3 Issue 2, July (2019) 
 
Executive, well as Heads of both the Senate 
and the House of Representatives,96 
something seen as a matter of right.97 In 
ensuring that the ruling party’s interest is 
well secured under the new government, the 
party leadership pushes the dogma of party 
supremacy down the throat of its members, 
making sure that all and sundry are whipped 
in line as to doing the party’s bidding as re-
gards the election of both the Senate 
President and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives. The result is that upon their 
emergence, these two leaders of the 
Legislature are expected to promote the in-
terest of the party by supporting the President 
at all times, notwithstanding that such agenda 
may be inimical to the overall good of the 
country.  
It was only in the year 2011 that a crack 
appeared in the wall of this long-established 
convention when Aminu Waziri Tambuwal 
against the choice of his party for the Office 
of the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, teamed up with members of 
the main opposition party to emerge as 
Speaker. He later defected to the opposition 
and remained in office till the end of his term 
as the Head of a branch of government not 
from the ruling party. The same scenario was 
repeated in 2015, when Dr. Bukola Saraki 
                                                          
96 In addition, even as the party who won the polls 
produces key Legislative office such as the Presi-
dent of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, it is also entitled to produce the 
Senate Majority Leader and the House Majority 
Leader, while the party who is the runner up is re-
warded with the positions of Senate Minority 
Leader and House Minority Leader. It was only in 
the year 2013 that a crack appeared in the wall of 
this long-stablished 
97  The same is the norm in nearly all other democrat-
ic countries with a leading example being the 
United States of America where the winning party 
after producing the President is most likely to pro-
duce the Speaker of the House of Representatives. 
and Hon. Yakubu Dogara both of the All 
Progressives Congress (APC) again enlisted 
members of the Peoples’ Democratic Party 
(PDP), to emerge Senate President and 
Speaker respectively.98 With the exception of 
these cases, from 1999 till date Nigeria’s 
brand of Executive/Legislative cooperation 
has remained a system whereby the 
Legislature becomes an appendage of the 
Executive, rubberstamping its actions with-
out little or no check. This has rendered the 
whole idea of separation of powers under the 
country’s constitutional practice of little 
weight. Under this sort of arrangements, the 
power becomes so fused and carefully 
managed in-house, with the sole aim of 
ensuring that the ruling party remains in 
power for as long as possible.  
Scholars have argued that Nigeria’s 
experience of prolonged Military rule in 
which both Executive and Legislature power 
was fused, contributed largely in entrenching 
the above system, especially when one 
considers the fact that most of the members 
of the current political class are themselves 
products of military rule99. It was under this 
atmosphere that the PDP, for instance, was 
able to maintain its grip on power as 
Nigeria's ruling party for 16 years, before it 
was dislodged following the victory of the 
APC at the 2015 General Elections.  The 
reality is that most of those who wield 
powers particularly in the Executive and 
                                                          
98  The emergence of the duo later degenerated into an 
acrimonious relationship with their party leader-
ship and the Presidency who accused them of be-
traying the party. The hostilities and political un-
dercurrents later saw both defects to the opposition 
PDP towards the end of their tenure.  
99 O. Fagbadebo and S. Francis, 2016, “Power 
Relations Amongst Institutions of Government in 
Nigeria’s Presidential System of Government: 
Issues and Contentions,” 7 (7), International 
Journal of Politics and Good Governance, p7. 
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Legislative branches of government in Nige-
ria come from the same political party, and 
they never hide the fact that they share the 
same political interest and agenda. From the 
foregoing, it can be argued that though the 
Nigerian Constitution advocates separation 
of powers between the Executive and the 
Legislature, what obtains in practice is a far 
cry from this and its application gives more 
of an impression of fusion than separateness. 
It is even worse at the State level, where 
separation of powers would appear to have 
been severely watered down, as most Legis-
lative houses are virtually in the pocket of the 
Executive usually personified by Governors 
who see themselves as ‘Constituted Authori-
ties’100. In most of these States, the other two 
branches of government practically live at 
the pleasure of the Executive, a phenomenon 
that is carefully designed before the govern-
ment even comes into being. For example, 
most of the State Governors have been ru-
                                                          
100 A perfect area of connivance between the State 
Governors and State Houses of Assembly is in the 
area of Local Government elections which has 
never seen the light of the day. The State 
Legislature simply rubber-stamps Caretaker 
Committees who hold office for donkey years and 
who are nothing but stooges of the Governor. For 
more insight on the politics of State Governors that 
have stifled the autonomy and democratic 
administration of Local Governments in Nigeria, 
see generally K. Olufemi, ‘Leadership in 
Administration: A Nigerian Local Government 
Outlook’, in Institutional Administration: A 
Contemporary Local Government Perspective 
from Nigeria, (Ikeja: Malthouse Press Ltd., 2000), 
p49; O. Oyediran, ‘Local Government as a Third 
Tier of Government in Nigeria: The 1976 Local 
Government Reforms and After, in J. Elaigwu, and 
R. Akindele, (eds.), Foundations of Nigerian 
Federalism, 1960-1995, (Jos: Institute of 
Governance and Social Research, 2001), pp194-
211; J.A.A. Ayoade, ‘The Development of 
Democratic Local Government in Nigeria’, in 
Local Government in Nigeria and the United 
States: Learning from Comparison, (Ile-Ife: Local 
Government Publication Series, 1995), pp19-20. 
mored to be the ones who personally hand-
pick candidates to run for elections into the 
Legislative houses such that once they suc-
ceed at the polls, their loyalty belongs to the 
Governor the benefactor, who is some sort of 
kingmaker. This is all in a revolving rentier 
system in which public office is generally 
deployed to facilitate private interest.101 It 
has also perpetuated a system in which the 
other two branches, particularly the Legisla-
ture remain under the dominating force of the 
Executive. For Nigeria to reinvent its consti-
tutional framework, therefore, this unhealthy 
state of affairs must give way to a proper 
flourishing of the system, especially one in 
which all three branches of government even 
though separate, can co-exist in a harmonious 
power relationship. 
 
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS VS 
COOPERATION DEBATE: THE JUDI-
CIAL BRANCH AS AN EXCEPTION 
The reality under contemporary 
constitutional practice is that the doctrine of 
separation of powers is past its prime and has 
far outlived it earlier eminence. A ray of 
hope is, however, seen in the fact that one out 
of the three branches of government still ap-
pears to be separate in terms of constitutional 
text and practice, and this is the Judicial 
branch. Even though attaining the ideals of 
independence of the judiciary remains more 
of a struggle in most developing democracies 
given that the then colonial powers were not 
interested in its development,102 in most 
                                                          
101 O. Eme and N. Anyadike, 2012, “Ruling Parties 
and Democratic Consolidation: The Case of 
People’s Democratic Party (1999-2009),” 1 (1), 
Review of Public Administration and Management, 
pp107-124.   
102  Y. Vyas, 1992, “The Independence of the 
Judiciary: A Third World Perspective,” 11 (6), 
Third World Legal Studies, p131. 
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countries one branch that seem to enjoy some 
form of ‘separateness’ is the Judiciary. This 
is predicated on the fact that it is the only 
branch whose members or head are not 
professional politicians, and so do not come 
into office through the boobytrap of politics.  
Given its apolitical nature therefore, great 
confidence is reposed in the Judicial branch, 
such that it can be called upon anytime to 
examine the political process which produced 
either the Head of the Executive or the 
members of the Legislature. For example, in 
Nigeria’s recent constitutional history the 
Judiciary in bearing its fangs has nullified 
key elections in which Governors had been 
fraudulently elected only for them to be 
removed from office.103 While lower courts 
have been active in reviewing the actions of 
executive and administrative bodies towards 
determining the true delineation of rights, 
duties, and obligations imposed by law,104 
the apex court in the course of the fourth 
republic has also left no stone unturned in 
uphold the Constitution when necessary.105 
However, this separateness and the 
whole idea of the independence of the 
Judicial branch continues to waver on shaky 
grounds. While on the one hand, Scholars 
argue that the Judicial branch itself has 
somehow being intruding into the powers of 
                                                          
103  In this wise, Governors Rotimi Amaechi, Kayode 
Fayemi, Olusegun Mimiko, Adams Oshiomhole, 
were key beneficiaries amongst other. See the fol-
lowing stand out cases, Peter Obi v. Independent 
National Electoral Commission (INEC), (2007) 
LPELR - SC 123/2007; Mimiko v. Independent 
National Electoral Commission (INEC), (2012) 7 
NWLR (Pt. 1300), p.538; Oshiomhole v. Inde-
pendent National Electoral Commission (INEC), 
(2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1279), p493.   
104  J.O. Agbana, 2006, “An Appraisal of the Doctrine 
of Natural Justice,” 2, Fountain Quarterly Law 
Journal, p156.  
105  R. T. Suberu, 2008, “The Supreme Court and Fed-
eralism in Nigeria,” 46 (3), The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, pp451-485. 
other branches of government,106 on the other 
hand, even the independence of the Judiciary 
in Nigeria does not appear constitutionally 
settled. This can be seen from the provisions 
of Section 17 (1) (e) of the Constitution 
which provides that "The independence, 
impartiality, and integrity of Courts of Law, 
and easy accessibility thereto shall be 
secured and maintained”.107 Unfortunately, 
this provision falls under what the 
Constitution refers to as ‘Fundamental 
Objectives and Directive Principles of State 
Policy’,108 a Chapter that is made non-
justiciable by reason of Section 6 (6) (c) of 
the Constitution, which renders its glowing 
letters on judicial independence of little or no 
effect.109 It can, however, be argued that 
since the Fundamental Objectives and 
Directive Principles of State Policy as a form 
of political contract are nothing but mere 
aspirations,110 the independence of the 
Judicial branch can still be deemed 
constitutionally secured in view of Section 6 
of the Constitution which extensively 
provides for the judicial powers of the 
Federation.111 
Current realities, however, show that 
notwithstanding the kind words of the 
                                                          
106  A.O. Nwafor, 2013, “The Lesotho Constitution 
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Constitution, Nigeria’s constitutional practice 
still finds itself trapped in serial attempts by 
the political class to fuse the Judicial branch 
into the marriage of convenience between the 
Executive and Legislature. This, therefore, 
calls for continuous vigilance. The current 
framework of separateness between the 
judicial branch and the Executive/Legislature 
must be commended, while more vigilance is 
demonstrated. To achieve this, legal minds 
have continued to call attention to why the 
total insulation of the Judicial branch must be 
the business of all.  According to Ikhariale, a 
deliberate separation of the Judiciary from 
the other two branches of government, is the 
only contrivance that can guarantee the 
durability of constitutionalism.112 
Reinforcing this position Phillip Kurland in 
his brilliant work ‘The Rise and Fall of the 
Doctrine of Separation of Powers’, opined 
that this stature of the Judicial branch derives 
majorly from the collapse of the doctrine of 
separation of powers and its failure to live up 
to its foundational objectives.113 He closed 
his thoughts by calling to remembrance the 
vigilance of the Judiciary which has made it 
the only bastion of hope for the people 
against the combined tyranny of the 
Executive and Legislature, but then warned 
that one can only hope that the Judiciary will 
continue to have the strength and will power 
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CONCLUSION 
This paper has examined the dilemmas con-
fronting the doctrine of separation of powers 
under Nigeria’s constitutional practice. It ex-
amines the historical development of the doc-
trine as well as its framework under the 1999 
Nigerian Constitution. It analyses the doc-
trine through the exercise of key governmen-
tal powers such as spending/budgetary pow-
ers, appointment powers, and mili-
tary/emergency powers. The paper draws the 
conclusion that except for the commendable 
independence of the judicial branch, there 
appears to be a fusion of powers between the 
Executive and Legislature, a development 
that has seen the Legislature tied to the apron 
strings of the Executive, and ensured that the 
former is continually dwarfed by the latter. 
The paper therefore concludes that for mean-
ing development in Nigeria’s constitutional 
practice, there is a need for the three branch-
es to be able to exercise their powers sepa-
rately, even though there may be instances 
where such powers may overlap for coopera-
tion, effective working of government, and 
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